Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
P rivate pension funds and the social security trust fund can be viewed as pools of money that are invested in financial assets today to provide benefits for retirees at some time in the future. At the present time, the trust fund is invested in U.S. government securities, and this allocation allows the government to use the funds raised from selling the bonds to the social security administration to provide various types of government supplied goods to the private sector. These can include both public goods and publicly provided private goods. A number of proposals have recently been introduced that share a common feature; investing at least part of the trust fund in the equity market.
1,2 These proposals mean that the trust fund would buy fewer U.S. government bonds and, hence, provide fewer resources for the provision of government supplied goods, but would, by investing some of its surplus in equities, provide extra resources for the purchase of private capital. In the range of proposals, 3 what can be called the minimalist one suggests that part
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1 Aaron and Shoven (1999) , Feldstein and Samwick (1998) , Kotlikoff (1996 Kotlikoff ( , 1998 , and Smetters (1997a Smetters ( , 1997b . 2 While revising this paper, we came across two pieces that explore the same issues as analyzed in our paper. Dotsey (1997) shows that investing part of the social security trust fund in equities will largely have a neutral effect. Diamond and Geanakopolos (1999) argue that investing all of the trust fund in bonds cannot be optimal if there are workers who do not invest their savings on their own. Therefore, they argue that there will be welfare gains from shifting at least a small proportion of the trust fund into equities. 3 Gramlich (1996) . of the social security trust fund should be invested in equities without changing the basic pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) philosophy of the current system. At the other extreme, the maximalist proposal amounts to shifting from a PAYGO to a fully funded (FF) system and to investing a fraction of the contributions in the equity market.
In this paper, we deal with this maximalist view. We start by showing that investing part (or the totality) of social security revenue in the equity market does not make any difference under three assumptions: (1) the transition generation is compensated by public borrowing, (2) the benefit rule is unchanged, and (3) individuals' portfolio choices are unconstrained. We then go on to show that when these assumptions do not hold, the reform is not neutral; it can be Pareto improving but it can also be Pareto worsening. The outcome depends crucially on the way portfolio choices are constrained, on how the benefit rule is changed, on how the transition generation is compensated, and on whether the government is viewed as supplying too much or not enough publicly provided goods. For example, if a majority of households are kept away from the equity market because of heavy entry fees, investing part of their contributions in the equity market can be Pareto improving. We show, in fact, that both sides of the debate on investing part of the trust fund in equities have a consistent intellectual basis for their positions. Unfortunately, testing the validity of their positions empirically is a more difficult task.
Since the question of how to invest the money in the trust fund does not depend on whether social security is of the PAYGO or FF type, we dispense with the issue of how social security is set up by first showing that under the above assumptions the two types are equivalent. 4 If the benefit rule and the overall liability of the public sector (public debt plus social security wealth) are kept constant, the whole incentive structure is also unchanged and nothing is modified. As argued elsewhere, 5 most proposals for shifting from PAYGO to FF include changes in the benefit rule (toward more actuarial fairness) and some benefit loss for the transition generation. Without these changes, it is pretty easy to show that shifting from PAYGO to FF, while creating an additional debt to compensate current retirees for their expected pension benefit, has no effect on the economy. Assume that we have a PAYGO system, where each worker pays a contribution equal to τ, and, hence, each retiree gets a benefit equal to τ(1 + g), where g is the rate of growth of the economy. We assume that g < r, where r is the rate of return on capital. Consider a shift to a FF system. With the elimination of the PAYGO system, the transition generation (the elderly at the time of the shift) will be left without any benefits. To prevent that outcome, the government can issue a debt equal to τ to ensure that the transition generation gets the retirement benefit it was promised when the PAYGO system was in operation. Each subsequent generation will pay τ, receive a pension equal to τ(1 + r), and will have to pay the net service on the debt, issued to prevent the transition generation from being left without a pension, equal to (r -g)τ. (By net, we mean that in a growing economy the service can be reduced by population and productivity growth.) This proves the equivalence between the two. Clearly, if we didn't compensate the transition generation, every subsequent generation 4 The equivalence discussed here is similar but not identical to Ricardian equivalence. Ricardian equivalence deals with switches between taxes and debt and how families can offset these switches through changes in bequests. Here, the neutrality is closer to Modigliani-Miller in the sense that we are talking about switches between assets within the government sector and how individuals can offset these changes by adjusting their portfolios. Thus, here one can get neutrality without having to deal with the issue of bequests. 5 Belan and Pestieau (1999). would get more, and it is possible in terms of social welfare that there would be a gain, but the shift is not Pareto improving since the initial generation is worse off.
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The above discussion also clarifies one of the reasons for the political push to a FF system. It is widely believed that switching from PAYGO to FF will automatically increase the return received from one's contribution to social security. While part of the push is coming from the belief that the return on equities (although risky) is higher than the return on U.S. government securities, there is also a belief that a FF system in general pays a higher return than does a PAYGO system. Even if this were true if one were setting up a FF system de novo, as the analysis above shows, any excess that might be obtained from switching from a PAYGO to a FF system will be siphoned off to ensure that the transition generation is left with funds for retirement. Thus, while many of the politicians believe that switching is like getting a "free lunch," there is, in fact, no free lunch.
Another argument in favor of the switch to FF is the belief that it would be harder for the government to dismantle social security if it were FF. Whether the basis for this view comes from the difference between FF and PAYGO, or the change in the benefit rule that people are demanding to make at least part of social security less redistributive along with the switch to FF, is less clear. If it were true that people would have more confidence in social security being there when they retire if the system were FF even with the benefit rule unchanged, people would behave differently under FF than under PAYGO. In that case, the two systems would have different implications for issues such as savings. It is not clear, however, that there is any objective basis for believing that government support would be different in the two cases, since as argued above, if the magnitude of retirement benefits and the mandatory contributions are kept unchanged, the only difference between PAYGO and FF is that under PAYGO the commitment to future retirees is an implicit government obligation, whereas under FF there would be an explicit debt. Thus, in this paper, we ignore the possibility that individuals may view the two systems differently.
The above argument about switching implicitly assumed identical individuals. In a world of different individuals, one can also show that PAYGO and FF are equivalent if the way benefits are linked to contributions is kept unchanged. Let us assume, for example, that all agents receive the same pension regardless of their contribution. We use the same reasoning as above to show equivalence except that in this case τ is now the average contribution. Having proven the equivalence between PAYGO and FF, in the remainder of this paper, we use only a FF system. We develop a model that incorporates uncertainty and in that context show that the asset composition of the FF system is irrelevant as long as individuals are unconstrained in their portfolio choice. Then we demonstrate that when individuals face constraints in the purchase of assets, changes in asset composition can have real effects. Most of these effects will result in ambiguous changes in welfare, but there are some changes that are Pareto improving and others that are Pareto worsening. As noted above, it is these latter ones that fit in well with the political debate that is taking place about investing some of the trust fund in equities.
The equivalence between riskless and risky investment of social security 6 If in the absence of a PAYGO system the economy happens to be in equilibrium at the modified golden rule capital stock, then it is clear that introducing a PAYGO scheme will reduce the size of the capital stock and thus welfare. This change, however, is not Pareto worsening since the first generation of retirees benefits from the shift. These issues are discussed in Feldstein (1998). revenue is in the tradition of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem or Modigliani and Miller. 7 Households that find that their social security benefits have suddenly become riskier will at once reshuffle their portfolio (including bonds, stocks, and social security entitlements) so as to keep risk and yield patterns constant. It is clear that if individuals' portfolio choices are constrained, their utility can increase or decrease following a move toward investing social security in the equity market. If some households are prevented from making their portfolio riskier because of prohibitive entry fees or transaction costs, investing their social security contributions in equities can increase their utility. On the other hand, if some individuals are reluctant to take any form of risk, imposing on them such a reform can be welfare worsening to the extent that social security entitlements cannot be traded.
Besides the three assumptions needed to obtain our equivalence propositions (full compensation of the transition generation, unchanged benefit rule, and unconstrained portfolios), we will make two additional assumptions. These assumptions, that we hope will help contribute to clarifying the debate, are that all uncertainty is macroeconomic and that there is no equity premium puzzle. We view macroeconomic uncertainty as shocks that affect the overall economy (such as recessions or booms) and thus that will to a greater or lesser extent affect all sectors of the economy. Microeconomic uncertainty, by contrast, can be viewed as sector or firm-specific shocks whose impact on individual portfolios can be mitigated through diversification. By focusing on macroeconomic uncertainty, we do not deny that there is also microeconomic uncertainty. We want to study an uncertainty that cannot be insured against by either the government or the market. As to the equity premium, we assume that the return in the equity market, while higher than the rate on safe bonds, when adjusted for risk is about equal to the return in the bond market. In comparing the rate of return on equity with the rate of return on safe government bonds, U.S. data for the last 100 years seem to show, however, that the difference in rates of return between these assets is larger than can be attributed to differences in risk as normally measured. This large difference in rates of return is known as the equity premium puzzle. A discussion of the equity premium puzzle is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic model is presented and, to provide a baseline, we show that when individuals are unconstrained, changes in trust fund strategies will have no real effect. In the third section, we consider the possibility of constrained portfolios and show that Pareto improvement can result from investing in the equity market under particular, but plausible, assumptions. A final section discusses the assumptions used in the paper.
THE MODEL AND BENCHMARK NEUTRALITY CASE
To make the argument as intuitive as possible, we use the simplest possible model with two types of individuals of equal number, two periods, and two states of the world in the second period. We assume a fixed-coefficient production technology. (One could alternatively think of this as a small economy that is a price taker.) This assumption allows interest and wage rates to be exogenous. Making interest rates endogenous would not change the results but would add complication. The bonds, B, in the model are assumed to be safe government bonds and the capital, K, represents physical investment whose rate of return depends on the state of nature. The production side plays a very passive role in the argument, whereas the consumption and saving side will be the outcome of rational choice by consumers. The following equations specify the individuals' optimization problem and the constraints they face. Thus, type i's problem, i = 1, 2, can be denoted as
In equation 1, U(.) and V(.) are strictly convex functions and δ is a factor of time preference. The individuals are assumed to differ by the amount they are able to save. Individuals of type 1 are assumed to have sufficient resources that they are able to save on their own, whereas type 2 individuals (when constraints are binding) will have no saving beyond what is accumulated through the government program. The individual maximizes utility, U(.), over the two periods where there is no uncertainty in period 0 but there are two possible states that can occur in period 1 each of which can occur with probability 0.5. Individuals are denoted by superscripts and subscripts are used to denote the period. However, in period 1 there may need to be two subscripts, the first to refer to the period and the second, where the variable varies across states of the world, the state of nature. The arguments of the utility function are consumption, c, and a publicly provided private good (hereafter referred to as PPPG), G i , to be defined below and which is considered as a given constant by consumers. For simplicity, we assume that the utility function is separable between privately produced goods and publicly provided ones. 
The L i 's can be viewed as efficiency labor and thus the amount provided can differ across individuals. To keep the model simple, as noted above, it is assumed that the production function is linear, where a and b are constants to denote the relative weights of capital and labor in production. The θ's refer to the productivity of a particular state. A more realistic specification is to write the productivities as a(θ) and b(θ) so they depend on the state of nature. One would then expect b(θ) to have a lower dispersion than a(θ). The only tax in this economy is on labor, L, where t is the tax rate. The two budget constraints for period 1 are similar except that individuals do not save in that period since the world is assumed to end at the end of period 1. Moreover, income in period 1, in addition 9 To be more complete, we should allow our individuals to consume public goods in both the initial period and period 1. However, that change would merely add a constant term to the analysis. A more thorough discussion would also allow public goods to be either complementary to or substitutable with private consumption. A discussion of these issues can be found in Possen and Slutsky (1980) . to the after-tax labor income, consists of the return on any bonds bought privately in period 0, the return on any capital bought privately in period 0, and the amount received in social security benefits, T i 1j . The fully funded social security scheme in the model can be represented as follows: Type i individuals are subject to a payroll tax,
We distinguish two types of social security systems. One is a purely individualized system in which everyone gets back what he has contributed plus the appropriate return and the other is a redistributive system wherein all revenues are pooled and divided equally among all individuals. We will use a to denote the individualized system and b for the collective one. Accordingly, social security benefits can be written as
where j = 1, 2 is the index for the state of nature. In this model, the payroll tax, t i 0 , is fixed, implying that the ratio
is really what matters. We are interested in a reform that consists of moving from having all social security contributions invested in government bonds to a program where at least part of the money collected by social security taxation is invested in the equity market.
If one now substitutes the three budget constraints, equations 2-4, into equation 1, individuals are left with two choice variables, the amount that will be saved through bonds, B i 1 , and the amount of capital that will be purchased, K i 1 . Optimizing over the two choice variables yields the first-order conditions
Combining equations 7 and 8 shows how savings will be allocated between the safe and risky assets:
) (r -aθ 12 ).
The last components added to our model are the government budget constraints. The government needs to balance its budget (through either the raising of taxes or the selling of bonds) each period and in each state. The government budget constraints are
Equation 10 is the government budget constraint in period 0. The government can use the funds raised from selling its bonds to both the public and the Social Security Administration to provide individuals with a private good (such as education) that can reflect individual contributions (equation 10a) or that can be identical for both types (equation 10b). The model introduces a type of symmetry. Bonds issued by the government raise funds so that the government has the resources to provide government supplied goods; equity issued by the private sector raises money for the purchase of private capital. While the funds raised by the government could be used to provide both public goods and government produced private goods (PPPG), to keep the analysis simple, we restrict government activities to the latter. We consider two alternative settings, one with and one without any redistribution. In the latter, public spending is financed according to the benefit principle; this is formally easier with PPPGs than with standard public goods.
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It should be noted that we are not trying to imply that the only source of funding for publicly supplied goods is the social security trust fund. Most of the funding for public spending comes from taxation such as the personal and corporate income taxes, unrelated to social security. However, the social security trust fund, as long as at least part of the funds are invested in U.S. government securities, gives the government the wherewithal to increase its supply of publicly supplied goods over and beyond what would have been possible if the trust fund were not available. If the trust fund now switches its allocation to more private equity investment and a reduced purchase of government bonds, the amount of private capital available to the economy will be increased and the amount of goods that the government can supply (without changes in the other taxes) will have to be reduced. It is this trade-off that we wish to explore in this paper. Since the other taxes and the public goods that can be supplied by that revenue do not affect our argument, for simplicity, we omit them here.
One other concept used in this paper is the oversupply or undersupply of PPPG. Our study is a positive and not a normative analysis and therefore we do not solve for the optimal level of PPPG; rather, we set the level of PPPG at a constant level. However, had we done so and used that level as a benchmark, then oversupply of PPPG would refer to the government supplying more of the PPPG than the optimal amount and undersupply would mean that the government is supplying less than that amount. Since the level of PPPG in this paper is an exogenous variable, as noted in equations 10a and 10b, the total value of government bonds that are sold is also a constant amount. If these bonds are safe bonds, then in period 1, as noted below, the amount of tax revenues required to repay the government debt will be the same irrespective of the state of the world, and thus, the taxes effectively become lump-sum taxes.
11 Of course, we could assume that the PPPG is always optimal without changing the gist of our argument. However, in the debate over privatization, a pervasive idea is that public debt is an easy way for the government to overspend and that investing the social security fund in stocks induces efficiency in the use of public funds.
In period 1, the government repays the interest plus principal on the bonds issued in period 0. As shown in equation 11, the resources needed to cover the refunding come from a tax on labor. In this model, it is assumed that the only types of shocks to affect the economy are macroshocks. Thus, all individuals and the government are affected by the same shock. To see that even the government cannot insure against aggregate shocks, assume that the economy goes into a recession. One usually thinks that through unemployment compensations the government is providing insurance. While the payments do help the people out of work, the money is taken from those people who are fortu- 10 With standard public goods, we would have to use Lindhal prices. 11 The PPPG could be made state dependent without affecting the analysis if the government used the money from the sale of the fixed amount of bonds to produce the PPPG and the productivity in government production varied across states.
nate enough not to have lost their jobs. Unless one can argue that the unemployed act differently than the employed in terms of their consumption decisions, the unemployment compensations will not mitigate the macrofluctuations, but rather will allow the downturn to be spread out across the population more evenly. In other words, if production falls due to a recession, incomes will be lower, taxes received by the government (unless the tax rate is raised) will fall, and output available for consumption and investment will be reduced. Thus, if the government wants to make government bonds safe in the sense that they pay the same rate of return irrespective of the size of the θ's, it needs to adjust the tax rate so that the tax rate becomes state dependent. Moreover, the greater the proportion of bonds in the pension as compared to risky capital, the greater this problem becomes. From equation 11, one sees that t i 1j θ 1j is state invariant. In other words, refunding bonds implies imposing a state-invariant lumpsum tax on state-variant income. Thus, the tax effectively becomes a lump-sum tax.
If one compares uncertain after-tax labor income when the tax rate is kept constant (and in which case tax revenues fluctuate) with the case where the tax rate is changed to keep the tax burden unchanged (lump sum), the instability of after-tax labor income is larger when the tax is lump sum. Moreover, the larger the tax burden the larger the difference in risk borne by laborers between the two cases. It is in this sense that we argue that when the government guarantees to pay a certain return on bonds, the risk is shifted from the social security payments to the after-tax income of the laborers.
We argue that the only way the government can make the bonds safe is by shifting the risk to workers through adjustments of the tax rate to effectively make it a lump-sum tax. This is similar to what state governments would have to do if they are required to balance their budgets when the economy fluctuates. For example, in a recession, the demand for unemployment benefits would rise and total gross labor income would fall. The government could continue to balance its budget only through a tax increase (or a decrease in the benefits provided). One might argue, however, that the federal government could solve this problem by issuing extra bonds. While the issuance of extra bonds to cover the imbalance is beyond the scope of our model, it is perfectly consistent with our analysis. If the government issues extra bonds and they are bought by laborers, to the extent that the workers hold the extra bonds, they must cut back on private consumption. This is, in fact, similar to what would happen when the tax rate is adjusted to cover the imbalance. Thus, the extra bond issuance is like an increase in taxes, and in fact, this argument is just a form of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem.
We now turn to our first proposition that states that under some plausible conditions, investing social security revenue in the equity market does not make any difference.
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Proposition 1: If all individuals are alike and unconstrained in their saving and investing decision, and if government transfer programs are fully funded, the government has no impact on individual decision making. If individuals are different, neutrality also holds as long as the FF benefit rule is not changed and no individual is constrained. 12 The results in this section are not dependent on our simplifying assumptions. It is very easy to verify that if one introduces a standard concave production function and adds labor-leisure choices into the utility function, the neutrality results shown in this section go through. The advantage of the more complete approach is that interest rates become endogenous and one can actually solve for the equity premium. The disadvantage is that with the more complicated model, it becomes much harder to get results when constraints are binding.
As this proposition is rather intuitive, we put the proof in the Appendix. The main motivation for presenting it is to provide a benchmark case; we are aware that the more relevant case is the one with nonneutrality. As already noted, to add some realism to the model, we have introduced, in addition to the social security program, a public sector that provides some private type of good (PPPG). This is the relevant way to justify the existence of a government bond market: postponing the payment for public spending. In this way, public investment in government output is treated in a similar way to private investment in private capital. An alternative way, simpler but less realistic, would have been to use the foreign bond market to finance the safe part of social security. Doing so would have made consumption in period 2 partially risky (domestic production) and partially risk free (principal plus return on the foreign borrowing).
This neutrality result might lead to the impression that social security is unnecessary. However, even if neutrality were realistic, one can give at least three rationales for a government run plan. The first is that one needs a large institution to insure against microrisks. Once an institution is large, government involvement is likely. Second, some individuals seem to be myopic toward retirement saving, which is different from being liquidity constrained. If the government does not set up a formal retirement fund that forces these myopic individuals to save when they are young, they will end up begging for help from the government in their old age after they have exhausted their resources and force or embarrass the government into providing help in any case. Finally, if any redistribution is going to be carried out, it needs to be done by the government. In this paper, we do not deal with the first two rationales, but rather limit our analysis to the last one.
Proposition 1 depends on three key assumptions: invariance of the benefit rule, the transition generation being compensated by public borrowing, and individuals being unconstrained in their saving and portfolio choice. Since the focus of this paper is the relative merits of investing some of the social security revenue in the stock market, in looking at deviations from neutrality in the next section, we will assume that the third assumption, the one on saving and portfolio choice, is violated.
NON-NEUTRALITY RESULTS
The issue we turn to next is the case of constrained individuals. There are several ways of introducing constraints, but in some ways, the most natural is to assume that individuals as they get older have no saving independent of what they get from the government. The way to analyze this situation is to assume that in period 1 individuals of type 2 consume an amount equal to the transfers received from the government, T 2 lj , and the income from their labor. In countries with rather generous social security programs, for more than half of the retirees, social security benefits make up almost the entirety of their retirement income. In the United States, this is also surely true for the bottom quintile of the income distribution. We assume that this income is rather low (L 2 < L 1 ). Because these individuals do not have private saving, they are so poor that they are not able to reshuffle the amount received from the government to allow their consumption path to differ from these sources of income. Individuals of type 1 continue to behave according to equations 1-4 and, since they are unconstrained, will take private actions to offset any changes the government may make in terms of how it funds its programs. Since the results for the individualized system with constraints are different from those for the redistributive system, we discuss the two cases separately in propositions 2a and 2b.
Proposition 2a: If some individuals are prevented from buying as much equity as they would like because of liquidity constraints, introducing risk into their social security benefits can improve their welfare without hurting unconstrained individuals when the system is individualized and there is no undersupply of PPPG. If some individuals are so risk averse that they are happy with safe social security benefits, making the social security benefits risky can hurt them without making the unconstrained individuals better off when the system is individualized and there is no oversupply of PPPG.
Proof:
We consider an initial situation in which all the social security contributions are invested in bonds and type 2 individuals only "save"
This amount is also the quantity of PPPG that they will receive. After the reform, the amount of B 2 g will be decreased. In fact,
. Type 2 individuals can be constrained in two different ways. Either they would like to have a riskier but on average higher consumption level in the second period or they would like, on the contrary, less risky consumption even if this means a lower expected value. These two cases are represented in Figure 1 . Using the standard state-preference approach with state 2 being the more favorable one, A denotes the consumption obtained without any equity and B denotes the consumption with all social security revenues invested in equity. The term C represents the postreform consumption. Which of the two cases prevails depends on the utility function of the individual. In Figure 1 , with utility v α , the reform hurts individual 2, and with utility v β , it improves his welfare. In either case, PPPG will be reduced and therefore the overall effect of the reform will depend not only on the type of liquidity constraint the individual is subjected to but also his consumption of PPPG. The welfare of individual 2 will unambiguously increase when there is an oversupply of PPPG and his utility function is of the v β type (i.e., not being able to take enough risk). It will unambiguously decrease when there is an undersupply of the public good and his utility function is of the v α type (i.e., facing too much risk). As to individual 1, his welfare is not affected by the reform as seen in the unconstrained case. Individuals of type 1 have positive B , which is unaffected by the reform. Throughout the above reasoning, two assumptions were crucial. First, individuals of either type do not see the effect of their choice on their consumption of PPPG. Second, the level of saving of type 2 individuals is fixed. In other words, they are not able to save privately.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2a is not exactly relevant to the present social security debate, since switching the allocation of the trust fund only affects the constrained individuals. However, there are individuals in the debate about social security reform who would love to see social security become much more individualized and to have it come closer to the type of framework used for proposition 2a. It is also interesting that many of those individuals are not constrained themselves and, as proposition 2a indicates, would not be affected by the changes discussed here. The constrained individuals, on the other hand, will see real effects. The majority of savings held by the relatively poor tends to be in fairly safe forms. While that allocation might be due to lack of information or transactions costs, it could also be due to high degrees of risk aversion. If this is the case for those individuals who are indeed constrained, they would be made worse off by a shift toward more private equity investment, assuming they feel that they are not being provided with an oversupply of the government produced private goods.
We now turn to the relevant proposition for the redistributive case.
Proposition 2b: When the social security system is redistributive and some individuals are liquidity constrained, introducing risk in their social security benefits has unambiguous effects in only two cases: a Pareto-improving effect when there is an oversupply of PPPG and the constrained individuals want more risk; and a Pareto-worsening effect when there is an undersupply of PPPG and the constrained individuals want less risk.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that bθ 0 L 2 is below the cutoff for the payroll tax contribution in the initial period and type 2 does not work in the second period. Thus, the constraints are
)/2 and c 2 1j
Investing a part of the social security revenues in equities has several effects. First, depending on their utility function (Figure 1) , type 2 individuals can gain or lose. Second, the level of PPPG (which is the same for both) is going to decrease for both types of individuals (except if type 1 individuals completely offset the drop in B 1 g
). Third, the increase in the capital stock, ∆K 1 g , is going to increase the production in period 2 for a given amount of saving (except again if type 1 individuals completely offset the increase in K 1 g
). Whether the reform is welfare improving depends on the relative magnitudes of these three effects. The reform implies that c 2 1j
is riskier but has a higher expected value than before. Type 1 individuals, who are here the only active agents, can neutralize the reform by choosing
In that case, ∆G = 0 and ∆(c 1 1j + c 2 1j ) = 0. Clearly, however, the condition for an optimal portfolio is not satisfied. With standard utility functions, one might expect that the first-order conditions for an interior maximum would imply only a partial reshuffling. In other words, aggregate equity holding will increase and aggregate bond holding will decrease. Whether the reform is good or bad for the unconstrained individuals depends on the marginal utility for PPPG. If it is very low (excess supply of PPPG), then the reform is welfare improving for individuals of type 1 and also for individuals of type 2 if at the outset they were willing to take more risk. On the other hand, if the marginal utility of PPPG is rather high (undersupply of PPPG), then the reform is bad for type 1 and also for type 2 individuals if they are very risk averse. Q.E.D.
Since our model assumes a linear technology, the changes described in Propositions 2a and 2b will have no effect on the equity premium. If, on the other hand, the production function were concave, so that changes in supply affect interest rates, an increase in demand for private capital and a decrease in demand for government bonds would tend to reduce the equity premium. However, the thrust of Propositions 2a and 2b would continue to hold even if one used a more general specification, and thus, for expository ease, we opted to use the linear technology assumption.
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In the statement of the proposition, the term liquidity constraint refers to both the nontradability of pension rights and various types of transactions costs such as entry fees and information costs. Proposition 2b gives a very nice summary of much of the social security debate. While there are many cases (in proposition 2b) that indicate that a switch toward investing some of the social security trust fund would have an ambiguous effect, there are two cases that stand out. The first is where individuals want more risk and there is an oversupply of PPPG. Many individuals who are advocating the shift in allocation by the trust fund toward the purchase of private equity tend to be on the more conservative end of the political spectrum. They tend to believe that the government is already too big and should reduce the amount of goods it supplies and also feel that the constrained individuals, given the choice, would choose to have the government invest at least a part of their funds in assets such as equity that pay a higher expected rate of return than they are getting from the present social security plan. Proposition 2b indicates that if their premise is correct, the switch would be Pareto improving. The second is where the constrained individuals want less risk and there is an undersupply of PPPG. Many of the people who are in favor of maintaining the status quo in regard to the trust fund tend to be on the more liberal wing of the political spectrum. They are more comfortable with a big government and would not be averse to an increase in the supply of public private goods. Moreover, they believe that the poorer people in society tend to be quite risk averse and would not feel comfortable having their money invested in equities. If these individuals are correct, proposition 2b indicates that the switch would be Pareto worsening. Unfortu- 13 An increase in equity purchases by the Social Security Administration for individuals of type 2 results in an increase in the size of the aggregate capital stock. If one assumes a nonlinear technology, the increase in the aggregate capital stock would alter both the rate of return on capital and the wage rate. However, Propositions 2a and 2b, with a minor adjustment, can still be shown to hold.
nately, it is very difficult to get data to adjudicate the debate, and thus, the ultimate decision will likely be a political one rather than one based on hard data. This proposition also raises some interesting questions. The first revolves around the appropriate rate of return on social security payments if they are indeed deemed to be safe. Social security payments are indexed for inflation, therefore, they are in some ways safer than Treasury bills. There has been some concern raised that social security will not be there when the next generation retires, but in fact, most people do believe that social security payments will continue far into the future even if the wealthy may get slightly less. Thus, to get some idea of the appropriate rate of return, one might look at the real rate of return on Treasury bills or longterm U.S. government bonds over an extended period of time. If one looks at the average rate of return from 1926 to 1997, one finds that the average nominal rate of return on Treasury bills was 3.8 percent; on long-term government bonds (average maturity of 20 years), the average nominal rate of return was 5.2 percent; and the average inflation rate over the period was 3.1 percent. If one uses these two assets as a benchmark, a 0.7 percent real rate of return on Treasury bills and a 2.1 percent real rate of return on long-term government bonds, 14 one sees that for a safe asset one should not expect to receive a return higher than g, the rate of population growth plus the rate of productivity growth. Thus, the unhappiness with the low rate of return on social security is displaced if one truly wants it to be a safe asset. Of course, part of the dissatisfaction arises from the fact that the total return over the same period of an index of the S&P 500 yielded a compound annual growth rate of 11.0 percent. This measure indicates that the real return on stocks over that period was 7.9 percent. While the real rate return on stocks was clearly higher than the rate of growth of the population plus productivity growth, that higher return came with a great deal of fluctuation in stock prices over the period.
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The second concerns the appropriateness of shifting part of social security (and/or its trust fund) into stocks and making at least part of the payment risky in the sense that the rate of return would depend on the return to capital in a particular state. The expected return would clearly be higher, but the risk would also be increased. As noted above, for unconstrained individuals, such a shift would be irrelevant. Thus, we should focus on the constrained agents. If the issue is transactions costs and lack of information and the government is more efficient in these respects, and if individuals would like more risk, the argument in favor appears very convincing. However, there is a downside from such a potential shift. Let us assume that some of the constrained individuals, i.e., the ones that rely almost exclusively on social security during retirement, have all their social security benefits fluctuate with the rate of return on capital, and in a particular state, due to macroeconomic shocks, the net rate of return on capital turns out to be negative. Would society let these people starve? If society would not let them starve, and in fact these individuals knew that society would not let them starve, these agents would want to take more risk knowing full well that others would be forced to bear part of their risk. (In our model, the 14 The statistics in this section were taken from Ibbotson (1998, chapter 2). 15 Dynamic efficiency of an economy requires that the net rate of return on capital be equal to or greater than the rate of growth of the population plus productivity growth. The data cited clearly indicates that the United States over that period was dynamically efficient. The growth literature has much less to say about what the rate of return on the safe asset (when there is also a risky asset) should be.
ones picking up the extra risk would be the workers.) Thus, these individuals would be receiving an asset (their social security benefits) that, at least from their perspective, pays a higher expected rate of return than capital and, moreover, has a lower risk. Therefore, while it is rational for these individuals to want to have their contributions to social security invested in capital, it is less clear that it is in society's interest to permit it.
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A third issue relates to political considerations. At the present time, the social security scheme is of the defined benefit type. This means that retirees are guaranteed a specific benefit and so macrouncertainty is borne by the workers. If part, or all, of the social security trust fund were used to purchase private capital, then the social security program would become at least partially of the defined contribution type. While this switch shifts more of the risk to the retirees, to the extent that the contributions are now put into individual accounts, people may feel that politically the government will have a much harder time doing away with social security if the accounts appear to be individualized. On the other hand, individualized accounts increase transactions costs (reducing the benefits of the higher gross returns from stocks as compared to safe bonds) and the government is still able to alter tax policy even when the social security program is of the defined contribution type, reducing the actual benefit of such a switch. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Diamond (1997) . Another political motivation for introducing individualized accounts may be that many individuals would like to see the benefit rule changed so that the social security scheme becomes less redistributive and they may feel that this type of switch would make it politically possible to do so. If the individualized accounts are actuarially fair, the rest of the social security program must become even more redistributive if the distribution of benefits is to be maintained. Politically, that may not be possible.
A fourth question concerns the role of the publicly provided private good in our analysis. We have used this specification for the sake of simplicity. In fact, our PPPG covers all kinds of public spending including pure public goods. The concern of our model is to consider both social security and public spending together. It meets the charge often heard that by financing the social security trust fund and more generally, in a fully funded system, the entire social security reserves with government bonds, it makes it too easy for the government to spend people's money. We show that this might be the case when there is an oversupply of the public good, that is, when the marginal utility of public spending is less than that of initial period consumption.
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that the social security scheme is of the defined contribution type and that the change in risk composition is announced before people make their portfolio choice. If it were not the case, there would be a clear welfare loss to that generation. Adding a grandfather rule to insure that changes only apply to the next generation, so that it makes its choice knowing that the change in rules has been made, would alleviate this problem.
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Before concluding, let us return to the two main features of the model. The first feature is that our model is one sector. Increasing the number of sectors, some of which produce output in a macro-risk-free fashion, would result in less aggregate uncertainty. However, while the amount of uncertainty would be less, the gist of the paper remains valid. The second feature is that the framework used here is static. An alternative would have been to use a dynamic overlapping generations model. The advantage of that framework is that the macrorisk can be shared across two generations. Thus, if one reduces the uncertainty for the retirees, one can do so by shifting it to the workers. However, even in this framework, the aggregate uncertainty remains.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of people have over the years suggested that social security invest some of its funds in risky equity to alleviate its financial problems and/or to give all retirees a "fairer" rate of return. In this paper, we have shown that such a shift would have no impact as long as individuals are unconstrained, but that it does have welfare implications if at least some agents face liquidity constraints. Two types of constraints can be observed. In the first, individuals cannot buy as much equity as they would like, and then the shift is welfare improving. In the second, individuals are so risk averse that such a shift makes them worse off. Which type of constraint prevails in the real world is an empirical question. It is clear that in liberal circles, one tends to believe that most constrained individuals do not want more risk and that there is no undersupply of public goods; by the same token, in conservative circles, one thinks that constrained individuals desire more uncertainty and that there is an oversupply of public goods. We believe that there is a little bit of both. How much? Here again, the answer can only be obtained by empirical means. In any case, it is most unlikely that investing social security funds in the equity market will be unanimously backed. From a normative viewpoint, there is room for using a social welfare function. One can conjecture that a very concave function, and in particular the Rawlsian criterion, will make it impossible to move toward investing any of the trust fund in the stock market without strengthening the safety net of providing a safe basic benefit. From a positive viewpoint, the absence of Paretian dominance, one way or the other, opens the way to the formation of all sorts of coalition formations. The status quo that is observed in many countries regarding social security reform can be interpreted as there existing a winning coalition of constrained individuals who don't want to take any risk and unconstrained individuals who are rather indifferent.
There are also a number of important issues relating to social security that we felt were beyond the scope of this paper. The issue of intergenerational risk sharing cannot be explored with our model. However, the shifting of risk between workers and nonworkers in our model as one shifts from defined benefit to defined contribution indicates how different generations will be affected by any potential changes in social security. When social security guarantees the retirees a safe benefit, much of the risk is borne by the workers, most of whom are young; but as one shifts some of the risk to retirees through equity investments, some of the burden is lifted from the shoulders of the workers and distributed to the older generation. We do not formally consider proposals that would eliminate redistribution within social security even though that may the secret agenda of some of those individuals who are advocating the privatizing of social security. We also do not consider some of the more standard rationales for the establishment of public retirement systems such as the myopia of consumers toward retirement savings or the microuncertainty in life duration. Finally, since our paper has a purely positive aim, we do not try to derive optimal levels of the distribution of social security or optimal levels of public spending.
